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Abstract
This paper shows how de Finetti's book-making principle, commonly used
to justify additive subjective probabilities, can be modi¯ed to agree with some
nonexpected utility models. More precisely, a new foundation of the rank-
dependent models is presented that is based on a comonotonic extension of the
book-making principle. The extension excludes book-making only if all gam-
bles considered induce a same rank-ordering of the states of nature through
favorableness of their associated outcomes, and allows for nonadditive proba-
bilities. Typical features of rank-dependence, hedging, ambiguity aversion, and
pessimism and optimism, can be accommodated.
Keywords: Book-Making, Comonotonic, Choquet expected utility, ambiguity
aversion, ordered vector space
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1 Introduction
De Finetti's book-making principle entails that a gambler should not endorse pref-
erences that can be linearly combined into a sure loss. A surprising implication is
that all uncertainties have to be expressed in terms of additive probabilities, possibly
subjective (de Finetti [10, 11, 12]). The principle has, since its discovery, served as
a justi¯cation of Bayesianism. The main restriction of the book-making principle is
that it requires outcomes to be expressed in utils, in other words, utility must be
linear. This requirement is reasonable for small stakes. Linear combinations of gam-
bles naturally arise in ¯nancial markets, where assets can be bought and sold at ¯xed
rates. The book-making principle then amounts to a no-arbitrage requirement which
is commonly accepted as normative in ¯nance ([29], [44].
There are many descriptive reasons, and according to some authors also normative
reasons, for deviations from Bayesianism. This insight has resulted from the Allais [3]
and Ellsberg [15] paradoxes and has led to a rich literature ([7] [39], [41]. The most
popular models today are the rank-dependent models (Quiggin [31], Schmeidler [38],
Tversky & Kahneman [43], Yaari [49], They allow for nonlinear sensitivity towards
uncertainty, modeled through nonadditive measures (capacities). Decision weights of
events depend on how favorable the outcomes of the events are in comparison to the
alternative outcomes of the gamble under consideration (rank-dependence). Basic ra-
tionality requirements such as transitivity and monotonicity are maintained but many
other deviations from Bayesianism can be accommodated. Examples are pessimism
(aversion to uncertainty and convex capacities), optimism (concave capacities), and
insu±cient sensitivity towards uncertainty (inverse-S capacities, overweighting un-
likely events and underweighting likely events [43]).
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In ¯nancial portfolios, investing in negatively correlated assets (hedging) is desir-
able. This phenomenon can be modeled by pessimism and convex capacities. Nonlin-
ear sensitivity towards probability also is an important factor underlying insurance.
In [47] it is found that people's common aversion to incomplete insurance cannot be
explained by curvature of utility but can be explained by nonlinear probabilities.
This paper combines the preceding two developments. That is, we assume utils
as outcomes and identify the books that can be made1 against the rank-dependent
models. It is easily seen that books cannot be made whenever the gambles considered
are \comonotonic" (same ordering of events according to favorableness of outcomes).
Examples will demonstrate that books must be due to hedging, optimism, and other
phenomena that all deal with noncomonotonic gambles. To the degree that such
phenomena are descriptively or even normatively desirable, the exclusion of books
is unwarranted. This paper studies a comonotonic Dutch book-making principle
that does not exclude books unless all acts are comonotonic and thereby does allow
for hedging, optimism, ambiguity aversion, etc. We show that such a book-making
principle is not only necessary, but also su±cient, for the rank-dependent models,
given payment in utils. Hence, a new foundation of the rank-dependent models results.
As a by-product of our analysis we show that the book-making principle is closely
related to an additivity condition for preferences that is well-known in decision theory
and that has been extensively studied in the mathematics literature. In a mathemat-
ical sense, our result extends Yaari's [49] theorem from risk to uncertainty. It is
remarkable that de Finetti's book-making principle, usually considered as inextrica-
bly associated with additive probabilities, can so easily be adapted to nonadditive
1making a book means a violation of the book-making principle
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probabilities.
2 De Finetti's Dutch book-making Principle
This section analyzes de Finetti's book-making principle. S = fs1; :::; sng is a ¯nite
state space, with subsets called events. One of the states is true and the others are
not true. A decision maker is uncertain about which state is true. Outcomes are real
numbers designating money. A gamble is a state-contingent payo®, e.g. a ¯nancial
asset. Formally, a gamble f is a function from the state space to the outcomes.
Gamble f will generate outcome f(s) if s is the true state of nature. Gambles are
often identi¯ed with n-tuples and, hence, the set of gambles is identi¯ed with IRn.
Sometimes probabilities of the states are given. Then the state space is a probability
space and gambles are random variables. In general, probabilities need not be given.
By < we denote the preference relation of the decision maker over the gambles. It
is a weak order if it is complete (f < g or g < f for all gambles f; g) and transitive.
The notation Â and » is as usual. Strict monotonicity holds if f Â g whenever f > g
(f > g means that f (s) > g(s) for all states s). For a gamble f , a fair price is an
outcome x such that x » f . As usual, outcomes are identi¯ed with constant gambles.
The Dutch book-making principle, also called coherence by de Finetti, is based on
the idea that a number of good decisions, when taken together, should be good still.
\Taken together" is interpreted as outcome-wise addition. A Dutch book, de¯ned
formally hereafter, consists of a number of preferences that, when taken together,
yield a loss for each state of nature. Obviously, such a result is not good and therefore
the (Dutch) book-making principle requires that no Dutch book exists.












gj(s) for all states s. ¤
In words, if replacing gj by f j is good for each j, then the joint result of these
replacements should not be a sure loss. Our presentation di®ers from de Finetti's in
four respects. First, de Finetti also considers multiplication by positive scalars, where






jgj(s) for some positive ¸js. We have dropped such scalar-multiplication be-
cause addition seems to be a more natural way of combining gambles than scalar-
multiplication and because the required implications can be derived from addition
alone. Second, de Finetti considers a game situation where an outside person can
take the decision maker up on any of his preferences. We have formulated the con-
dition in a single-person decision making context so as to avoid distortions due to
strategic considerations (see de Finetti [11], footnote (a) in the 1964 translation) and
the state of information of the outside person.
Third, as will be demonstrated in Theorem 2, the book-making principle is based
on two principles, strict monotonicity and additivity (f < g implies f + h < g + h
for all gambles f; g; h). In his discussions, de Finetti emphasized monotonicity but
we, as many other authors, think that the essence of the book-making principle lies
in additivity ([7] p. 359 second full paragraph, [36]). For moderate stakes, additivity
seems a reasonable condition. The receipt of act h does not change the situation or
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needs of the decision maker much and, hence, it seems reasonable that the preference
between f and g is not a®ected.
Fourth, de Finetti did not invoke a completeness requirement imposed on all
gambles but instead he took an arbitrary set of gambles and their fair prices as the
initial domain of preference. Because all linear combinations were incorporated also,
his domain was a linear subspace on which, through the fair prices, a weak order
was obtained. The extension of the following result to linear subspaces is omitted for
simplicity of the presentation.
THEOREM 2 The following three statements are equivalent for < on IRn.
(i) There exist probabilities p1; :::; pn such that preferences maximize expected
value f 7! p1f (s1) + :::+ pnf (sn).
(ii) < is a weak order, for each gamble there exists a fair price, and no Dutch
book can be made.
(iii) < is a weak order, for each gamble there exists a fair price, and additivity
and strict monotonicity are satis¯ed.
¤
We end this section with some comments on related mathematical results. There
are many results similar to the equivalence of (i) and (iii) with continuity instead
of the fair price condition and with an invariance condition for scalar multiplication
(homotheticity) added ([5] Theorem 4.3.1, [28], [33], [35], [48]. Additivity of prefer-
ence amounts to commutativity of an ordering and an addition operation which is
extensively studied in the mathematics literature ([4] Chapter 15, [18], [24] Section
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2.2.5). These results often consider more general state spaces and outcome spaces.
Wakker [46, Theorem A2.1] presented a related result that did not use scalar multi-
plication either but used a stronger monotonicity condition plus continuity. Trockel
[42] and Candeal & Indur¶ain [8] present results without monotonicity for the pref-
erence relation or the representing linear functional. The additivity axiom was also
central in early axiomatizations of case-based decision theory [19, 20]. The mathe-
matics is related to invariance of preference with respect to a mixing operation ([16],
[45]) which similarly leads to linear representations. In Theorem 2, we did not seek
for maximal mathematical generality. The purpose of the theorem is to present de
Finetti's book-making principle as an individual coherence condition while avoiding
game-theoretic complications.
3 Hedging, Uncertainty Aversion, and Comono-
tonic Books
We present three examples of violations of the Dutch book-making principle. The
¯rst illustrates how Dutch books can help uncover irrationalities and is primarily of
descriptive interest. The second example is based on hedging which was put forward
by Yaari [49, p. 104] as a rationale for the rank-dependent models. The third example,
the Ellsberg paradox, shows how aversion to unknown probabilities leads to a Dutch
book, illustrating once more that additive probabilities cannot describe this paradox.
EXAMPLE 3 Consider gambles on a roulette wheel. There are 37 states of nature,
corresponding to one of the numbers 0, ..., 36 being selected. A bet of $1 on a single
number yields a net pro¯t of $36¡ $1 = $35 if the number shows up and ¡$1 oth-
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erwise. A gambler may be indi®erent between betting on each of the numbers but
prefer any such bet to not betting. The resulting preferences constitute a Dutch book:
(35;¡1;¡1; : : : ;¡1) < (0; : : : ; 0)




(¡1;¡1;¡1; : : : ; 35) < (0; : : : ; 0) but
(¡1;¡1;¡1; : : : ;¡1) < (0; : : : ; 0). ¤
EXAMPLE 4 [Hedging] Assume that a coin is tossed once and the state space is
fheads, tailsg. (20; 0) denotes the gamble yielding $20 if heads and $0 if tails. The
other gambles are de¯ned similarly and relate to the same toss of the coin. The
following preferences are natural but generate a Dutch book.
(9; 9) < (20; 0)
(9; 9) < (0; 20) but
(18; 18) < (20; 20).
The preferences in this example are traditionally explained by expected utility
with concave utility. For moderate stakes, however, utility is close to linear and
an alternative explanation for the observed risk aversion seems to be more plausible.
Such an alternative explanation will be provided later, based on a nonlinear sensitivity
towards chance. Note that, when the gambles (20; 0) and (0; 20) are taken together,
one gamble serves as a hedge for the other. ¤
8
EXAMPLE 5 [Ellsberg Example] Assume an urnK (known) containing red and black
balls in equal proportions and an urn A (unknown or ambiguous) containing red and
black balls in an unknown proportion. From each urn a ball will be drawn at random
and its color will be inspected. The state space is fBkBa; BkRa; RkBa; RkRag, where
BkBa refers to a black ball from urn K and a black ball from urn A, and the other
states are de¯ned similarly. Act (1; 0; 1; 0) yieds $1 if the ball from A has color
black and yields nothing otherwise; other acts are de¯ned similarly. The following
preferences are commonly observed for ² = 0.
(1; 1; 0; 0) < (1 + ²; 0; 1 + ²; 0)
(0; 0; 1; 1) < (0; 1 + ²; 0; 1 + ²) but
(1; 1; 1; 1) < (1 + ²; 1 + ²; 1 + ²; 1 + ²).
For ² > 0 su±ciently small the preferences will still hold and a Dutch book results.
The left acts provide a hedge for each other as in the preceding example because
their combination replaces risk with certainty. This same hedging takes place when
the right acts are combined, but in addition the uncertainty about the probabilities is
removed [27]. It is well-known that these preferences cannot be explained by expected
utility or any other model using additive probabilities. ¤
The examples have something in common. In each case, good and bad outcomes of
the gambles in a summation neutralize each other. In the ¯rst example, the gambles
added are to some degree substitutes for each other. The hope for a good outcome
of one gamble loses some of its force if the gamble is added to another gamble that
already provides a similar hope. In the second example, a complementarity e®ect
takes place in the addition of the gambles (20; 0) and (0; 20). The aversive zero
outcome of each is compensated by the large $20 outcome of the other (hedging).
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In the third example, adding (1 + ²; 0; 1 + ²; 0) and (0; 1 + ²; 0; 1 + ²) removes the
uncertainty about the unknown probabilities of the outcomes.
In each example, variability of one gamble is tempered by counter-variability of
the other one. The mentioned interaction e®ects do not arise when the gambles added
are \comonotonic." A set of gambles is comonotonic if for each pair of elements f; g
there do not exist states s; t such that f(s) > f(t) and g(s) < g(t).
We next introduce a generalization of the book-making principle suggested by the
preceding considerations. A comonotonic (Dutch) book is a book as in De¯nition 1
with the extra restriction that the set of gambles considered (ff 1; : : : ; fn; g1; : : : ; gng)
is comonotonic. The comonotonic (Dutch) book-making principle requires that no
comonotonic Dutch book exists. Similarly, comonotonic additivity means that f < g
implies f + h < g + h for all comonotonic gambles f; g; h.
We next de¯ne Choquet expected value, the model characterized by the comono-
tonic Dutch book-making principle. It is the rank-dependent model for decision under
uncertainty, i.e. the context where no probabilities are given. Because payment is in
utils, no utility function need to be de¯ned; put in other words, utility is assumed
to be linear. We therefore use the term Choquet expected value instead of Choquet
expected utility. A capacity W is a function W : 2S ! [0; 1] satisfying (a) W (;) = 0,
(b) W (S) = 1, and (c) W is nondecreasing with respect to set inclusion. Choquet





represents <, where the decision weights ¼j are de¯ned as follows. First, a permuta-
tion ½ is chosen such that f(s½(1)) > ¢ ¢ ¢ > f (s½(n)). Next, ¼½(i) = W (fs½(1); : : : ; s½(i)g¡
W (fs½(1); : : : ; s½(i¡1)g; in particular, ¼½(1) = W (s½(1)). The decision weights are non-
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negative and sum to one.
THEOREM 6 The following three statements are equivalent for the preference rela-
tion < on IRn.
(i) There exists a capacity W such that preferences maximize Choquet expected
value.
(ii) The binary relation < is a weak order, for each gamble there exists a fair
price, and no comonotonic Dutch book can be made.
(iii) The binary relation < is a weak order, for each gamble there exists a fair
price, and comonotonic additivity and strict monotonicity are satis¯ed.
¤
The risk seeking in Example 3 can be explained by a capacity W assigning a
weight exceeding 1=36 to each number. This capacity implies an overweighting of
unlikely events and risk seeking for long-shot options. In Example 4, hedging can be
explained by a capacity W with W (Heads) = W (Tails) < :45. This choice yields a
decision weight of less than :45 for the 20 outcome and a decision weight exceeding
:55 for the zero outcome. Consequently, the observed risk aversion is not ascribed
to diminishing marginal utility as this was traditionally done, but it is ascribed to
the extra attention paid to the zero outcome. The aversion to unknown probabilities
in Example 5 can be explained by any capacity W assigning a greater value to the
events fBkBa; BkRag and fRkBa; RkRag, describing the colors from the known urn
K than to the events fBkBa; RkBag and fBkRa; RkRag, describing the colors from
the unknown urn A.
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We end this section with some comments on related mathematical results. There
have been several variations on Statement (iii) in the literature. [13] used comonotonic
additivity together with continuity but without any monotonicity to characterize a
nonmonotonic generalization of CEV. Already Schmeidler [37] used a comonotonic
additivity condition for functionals, in combination with continuity, to characterize
noncomonotonic CEV functionals; he also characterized the monotonic case. The lat-
ter case is also characterized in [22]. Schmeidler's [38] comonotonic mixture-invariance
condition for preferences is famous. It was used to obtain linearity with respect to
second-stage probabilities. Chateauneuf ([9], Theorem 1) generalized Schmeidler's
preference condition, considering mixtures of outcomes rather than of probabilities.
4 Discussion
The book-making principle relies on linear utility. Linear utility is reasonable for
moderate amounts of money ([14], [17], [25] p. 290, [26] p. 86, [32] p. 176, [34] p. 91).
In fact, the rank-dependent model suggests that much of the deviations from expected
value observed for moderate amounts of money, and traditionally ascribed to curva-
ture of utility, is due to nonlinear sensitivity towards probability. This suggestion
is supported empirically by Selten, Sadrieh, & Abbing [40]. They compared nonlin-
earity of outcome sensitivity with nonlinearity of sensitivity towards probability. For
the small outcomes considered (ranging between ¡$1 and $3), nonlinear sensitivity
towards probability was more pronounced.
Our model can be interpreted as a return to [30]. That paper, one of the earliest
empirical studies of risk attitude, already used nonlinear probabilities rather than
nonlinear utilities to explain the deviations from expected value. Yaari [49] also
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assumed linear utility in his derivation of rank-dependent utility for risk and our
model can be considered the generalization of Yaari's model to uncertainty.
Many studies into the nature of nonadditive probabilities are going on today. If
both utilities and probability weights are unknown, complex measurement methods
have to be invoked ([1], [6], [21], [43]. We suggest that linear utility is a good approx-
imation for moderate stakes and, hence, that gambles with moderate stakes provide
an easy tool for measuring nonlinear probability weighting ([23]; Diecidue, Wakker,
& Zeelenberg, in preparation).
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2. The implication (i) ) (ii) follows from substitution.
Next we assume (ii) and derive (iii). For strict monotonicity, assume that f < g
and f(s) < g(s) for all s. The preferences immediately entail a Dutch book and,
hence, a contradiction. Strict monotonicity follows. For each gamble f , de¯ne FP (f)
as the fair price of gamble f . FP is uniquely determined and represents preference
(f < g if and only if FP (f ) > FP (g); note that x > y implies xy because of strict
monotonicity). We claim that FP satis¯es additivity (FP (f + g) = FP (f) +FP (g),
also known as Cauchy's functional equation). To wit, if FP (f +g) < FP (f)+FP (g)
then a Dutch book
f < FP (f )
g < FP (g)
FP (f + g) < f + g
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f + g + FP (f + g) < f + g + FP (f) + FP (g)
results and, hence, a contradiction. If FP (f+g) > FP (f)+FP (g) then the reversed
preferences result in a Dutch book. Additivity of FP follows. Additivity of FP
implies additivity of <; hence, Statement (iii) follows.
We ¯nally assume (iii) and derive (i). FP is de¯ned as above and represents
preference. We again derive additivity of FP . f » FP (f ) implies, by two-fold
application of additivity (with < and with 4), that f + g » FP (f) + g. Additivity
and g » FP (g) imply that g + FP (f) » FP (g) + FP (f ). Transitivity implies that
f + g » FP (f) + FP (g); hence, FP (f + g) = FP (f) + FP (g).
Additivity means that Cauchy's functional equation holds which, together with
strict monotonicity, implies that FP is a linear functional ([2] Theorem 2.1.1.1).
FP (f) =
Pn
j=1 pjf(sj) for real numbers pj. The pjs are nonnegative for if one, say
p1, were negative then we could ¯nd a gamble (M; 1; : : : ; 1) with M so large that the
FP of the gamble would be negative, implying that it is less preferred than the 0
gamble, thus violating strict monotonicity. Finally, FP (1) = 1 implies that the pjs
sum to one. Statement (i) has been proved. ¤
Proof of Theorem 6. The implication (i)) (ii) follows from substitution. The
implication (ii) ) (iii) is established as in the proof of Theorem 2, with the appropri-
ate comonoticity requirements added; note that constant gambles are comonotonic
with all other gambles.
We ¯nally assume (iii) and derive (i). That FP is representing and satis¯es
comonotonic additivity (FP (f + g) = FP (f ) + FP (g) holds whenever f and g are
comonotonic) is demonstrated exactly as in the proof of Theorem 2, again with all ap-
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propriate comonotonicity requirements added. We ¯nally show that FP is a Choquet
integral.
For any event E and real ¸, ¸E denotes ¸ times the indicator function of E. For
any ¯xed E, ¸ 7! FP (¸E) satis¯es Cauchy's equation on the nonnegative reals. On
that set, the mapping is bounded on a nondegenerate interval, i.e., it is bounded
above on [0; 1] by FP (2; : : : ; 2). Hence, FP is linear on this set ([2], Theorem 2.1.1.1)
and FP (¸E) = ¸W (E) for the real number W (E) = FP (1E). W (;) = 0 and
W (S) = 1 follow because FP assigns fair prices. W is monotonic with respect to set
inclusion: If A ¾ B but W (A) < W (B), then we can ¯nd ¸ su±ciently large to imply
FP (¸A + (1; : : : ; 1)) = FP (¸A) + FP (1; : : : ; 1)) < FP (¸B), contradicting strict
monotonicity. Hence W is monotonic with respect to set inclusion, which implies
that W is nonnegative.
Every gamble can be written as a sum
Pn
j=1 ¸jEj ¡ (M; : : : ;M) for nonnegative
¸j , nonnegative M , and decreasing sets E1 ¾ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¾ En. To wit, in En the gamble is
minimal, its second-smallest value is taken in En¡1En, etc.; if the minimal value is
negative then M is taken positive so as to have ¸n nonnegative). . By comonotonic
additivity, FP (
Pn
j=1 ¸jEj ¡ (M; : : : ;M)) =
Pn
j=1 FP (¸jEj) ¡ FP (M; : : : ;M)) =
Pn
j=1 ¸jW (Ej)¡M which is the CEV value of the gamble with respect to the capacity
W . ¤
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